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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
JACOB ALLEN HICKEY, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
          NO. 43855 
 
          Canyon County Case No.  
          CR-2015-16815 
 
           
          RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
 
     
      Issue 
Has Hickey failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion, either 
by imposing a unified sentence of eight years, with two years fixed, upon his guilty plea 
to felony injury to a child, or by relinquishing jurisdiction? 
 
 
Hickey Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
 
 Hickey pled guilty to felony injury to a child (amended from lewd conduct with a 
minor under 16) and the district court imposed a unified sentence of eight years, with 
two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp.22-23, 29-30, 58-60.)  Following the 
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period of retained jurisdiction, the district court relinquished jurisdiction.  (Order 
Relinquishing Jurisdiction (Augmentation).)  Hickey filed a notice of appeal timely from 
the judgment of conviction.  (R., pp.63-66.)   
Hickey asserts his sentence is excessive in light of his mental health issues, 
purported remorse, and because, “[a]lthough [he] has a long history of misdemeanor 
offense[s], this case is his only felony conviction.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-6.)  The 
record supports the sentence imposed.   
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard 
considering the defendant’s entire sentence.  State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 
P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 
(2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)).  It is presumed that the 
fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement.  Id. 
(citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).  Where a sentence is 
within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear 
abuse of discretion.  State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing 
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).  To carry this burden the 
appellant must show that the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the 
facts.  Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615.  A sentence is reasonable, however, if it 
appears necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting society or any of the 
related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.  Id.   
The maximum prison sentence for felony injury to a child is 10 years.  I.C. § 18-
1501(1).  The district court imposed a unified sentence of eight years, with two years 
fixed, which falls well within the statutory guidelines.  (R., pp.58-60.)  At sentencing, the 
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district court articulated the correct legal standards applicable to its decision and also 
set forth in detail its reasons for imposing Hickey’s sentence.  (Tr., p.40, L.7 – p.43, L.6.)  
The state submits that Hickey has failed to establish an abuse of discretion, for reasons 
more fully set forth in the attached excerpt of the sentencing hearing transcript, which 
the state adopts as its argument on appeal.  (Appendix A.)   
Hickey next asserts that the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing 
jurisdiction because he “was relinquished approximately two months after the district 
court retained jurisdiction” and therefore was not provided “the full rider programming.”  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.6-7.)  Hickey has failed to establish an abuse of discretion. 
“Probation is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court.”  I.C. § 19-2601(4). 
 The decision to relinquish jurisdiction is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial 
court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.  See 
State v. Hood, 102 Idaho 711, 712, 639 P.2d 9, 10 (1981); State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 
205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 1990).  A court’s decision to relinquish 
jurisdiction will not be deemed an abuse of discretion if the trial court has sufficient 
information to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be 
inappropriate under I.C. § 19-2521.  State v. Chapel, 107 Idaho 193, 194, 687 P.2d 583, 
584 (Ct. App. 1984).   
Hickey has not shown that he was an appropriate candidate for probation.  The 
psychosexual evaluator determined that Hickey posed a high risk to sexually reoffend 
and was “less likely to comply with supervision than the typical sex offender.”  (PSI, 
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p.119.1)  The psychosexual evaluator recommended that treatment take place “in a 
structured environment that could limit [Hickey’s] access to potential victims and 
opportunity to commit a future sexual offense.”  (PSI, p.119.)  The district court granted 
Hickey the opportunity to participate in the retained jurisdiction program, stating, “Mr. 
Hickey, I’m giving you a chance to demonstrate that you can get involved and take sex 
offender treatment seriously.”  (Tr., p.44, Ls.13-15.)  Rather than doing so, Hickey 
repeatedly violated the program rules, racking up at least six incident reports and 
corrective actions throughout his two months at NICI, for conduct including horseplay 
(he “almost kicked another inmate”), speaking inappropriately to staff, aggressive 
posturing, failing to be inspection ready, sleeping through count, and “two separate but 
related verbal altercations” on February 17, 2016, “which almost lead to two fights.”  (C-
Note Summary, pp.1-3, attached to APSI (Augmentation).)  Program staff reported that, 
several days before the verbal altercations occurred, “the entire unit was warned about 
avoiding verbal altercations of this sort or the resulting consequences would be removal 
from the program.”  (APSI, p.1 (Augmentation).)  NICI staff described the first February 
17th altercation as follows: 
The first incident which took place during official count, Mr. Hickey 
mutually engaged in a verbal altercation with inmate X and called inmate 
X a Cho-mo commonly known as a child molester on numerous 
occasion[s].  Mr. Hickey also made statements insinuating the [sic] 
inmate X was butt fucked and probably had it coming and wouldn’t be 
surprised if he didn’t like it.  Mr. Hickey also called inmate X out to the 
shower (common term used in prisons to call another inmate out to fight) 
when the verbal altercation was going back and forth to which a 
bystander intervened and told them to stop.  Mr. Hickey also threatened 
inmate X when he stated, [“]If you don’t fucking shut up, [I’ll] rip up off (his 
bunk) by your fucking head and slam your face into the floor.[”]   
                                            
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “Hickey 
Exhibits #43855.pdf.”   
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(C-Note Summary, p.1, attached to APSI (Augmentation).)  After the first incident, 
Hickey “went outside and spoke about it with a third offender.  Mr. Hickey and the third 
offender then went back over to the first offender's bunk and initiated another verbal 
altercation in which further harassing comments were made.”  (APSI, p.1 
(Augmentation).)  Consequently, Hickey received a DOR for harassment and was 
removed from NICI with a recommendation for relinquishment.  (APSI, pp.1-2 
(Augmentation).)  NICI staff advised that the recommendation was based on Hickey’s 
failure to demonstrate “amenability to Sex Offender treatment in the community due to 
the risk of not being viable to the rules and expectations of probation.”  (APSI, p.2 
(Augmentation).)  NICI staff also recommended that Hickey participate in sex offender 
treatment “in a more secure environment.”  (APSI, p.1 (Augmentation).)   
The district court considered the relevant information and reasonably determined 
that Hickey was not an appropriate candidate for probation, particularly in light of his 
abysmal conduct in the retained jurisdiction program, lack of amenability to community-
based treatment, and high risk to reoffend.  Given any reasonable view of the facts, 
Hickey has failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing 
jurisdiction.   
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Conclusion 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Hickey’s conviction and 
sentence and the district court’s order relinquishing jurisdiction. 
       
 DATED this 19th day of May, 2016. 
 
 
 
      __/s/_Lori A. Fleming__________ 
      LORI A. FLEMING 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      VICTORIA RUTLEDGE 
      Paralegal 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 19th day of May, 2016, served a true and 
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to: 
 
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED  
  DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 
at the following email address:  briefs@sapd.state.id.us. 
 
 
 
      __/s/_Lori A. Fleming__________ 
     LORI A. FLEMING 
Deputy Attorney General    
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State's recommendation of two years fixed and 
eight years indeterminate is not an unreasonable 
recommendation and not inconsistent with handling 
similar cases or with the risk level that has been 
prescribed by Dr. Johnston. 
!iul>mlL , Judg e . 
With that, I'll 
THE COURT: The Court has considered the 
presentence investigation report, attachments 
t.hP.rP.t.o, whir:h inr:lnrlP.rl .'I mP.nt.'ll h~.'llth exam. 
Defendant does suffer from some mental health 
problems. 
evaluation. 
Has also considered the p:,yc:hnsP.xun.1. 
The victims have chosen -- or 
vi<..:Llm'::; L:1mlly bdve <..:h<>:;;eo 110L L<.> be pre:,enL dlld 
make a statement to the Court . 
Court has considered the plea agreement 
but bccnu~e of Dr. Johnston's recommendation was 
above what was considered in the agreement for 
recommendations for sentence. Has considered the 
statements of the attorneys and the defendant's 
statement . 
Sentencinq qoals as set forth in 
St.ate v. Toohill, No. 1 of which is protection of 
society, No. 2, deter ren~e tn both this def endant 
and to others, No. 3, possibility of 
rehabilitation, No. 4, punishment and retribution. 
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I've also consjdered those items set 
forth by the Idaho legislature in Idaho Code 
19-2S21 . 
In this case there is a large disparity 
between what the victim repo rt ed a nd what the 
defendant admitted to. The victim's report 
recognizing it was withheld for a few days, but I 
don ' L think that's all that unusual -- indicated 
she wa!:i q uote, raped , end quote by the defendant. 
She was asleep on the sofa, woke up wilh Lhe 
de fe ndant' s hand over h er mouth, him pul ling h er 
pants down off of on e leg , and then engaging in a 
sex act . Her coying thot 3hc tri~d to ~oy no. It 
wa s a muffled no because of the hand on her fa ce , 
but she was trying Lo say no. 
The de fe ndant' s ver!:iion i s about 180 
degre~s from that, indicating that the vicLim was 
fl i rting with him ;inrl , in tact, she instigated the 
contact and was in total consent with the 
activi ti es that occurred at that time. 
I do acknowledge thi s was amended to 
injury to child. Defendant 's re liance on the 
polygraph he pass ed doesn't clear up any of this 
cii ~p;iri ty hetween the two stoz:ies of 1>1lial hdppe11e<l 
for the Court . 
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Then I tu rn to the p~ycho~exual 
e v al uation contained by Dr. Johnston -- or 
p~rtormed hy nr. Jnhn~ton . And T acknowledge that 
pu rsu ant to th e S hipley -2 test, which i~ a mea sure 
of intelligence, defendant scored below a verag e in 
vuc;abulary, abstraction, and composite, A. I 
th i nk tho se contribute Lo Lhe determination of a 
high risk to reoffend. 
llP.fP.nrl11nt admjts al coho l was involved 
in this matter . Hut Or. Johns t on, in looking at 
the other tests performed , indicated a lso that 
Lhey do suggest antisocial personality 
characteristics , l a ck of concern fo r othcrc, and a 
general d i sdain for women or lack of respect for 
wnmPn. He d id recommend treatment beqin in a 
structured environment. 
Without a trial and a finding as to the 
d isparate facts of what ac tually occurr.P.d , r.hi ~ 
Court is limited co what t he defendant admitted, 
wh i ch was an inj~iry Lo c:hild and supposedly 
c:onsensual sexual ac ti vity wiLh c:1 15-ytHIL·-old by a 
23 - y~,n-old man. 
In light of all thos e matters, the 
Court h.:i~ determined to do the tollnwing . T ~m 
going to impose a sentence of eight years , two 
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fixed followed by Lhree indeterminate (sic) . I 
wil l retain juri sdiction on tha t sentence for a 
period ot up to JG~ days to allow defendant tu 
begin hi s tr.entmen t in a structu red environment as 
r ecommend e d by Dr . Johnston and to evaluate how he 
performs i n that . 
I am going to impose fines inc luding 
court costs of $550. Order reimbursement to 
C:1:inyon County pa rtially for Lbe service s of the 
public defender in the amount of $300. I wil l 
grant a civil penalty to t he v ictim in the amount 
o f $2,500. Defendant will be required also to 
make res titu tion !or Dr. J ohnston's eva l uation, 
wh jch was paid by the county, in the amount o f 
$1,4~0 . 
T rim c:ioing to e xtend the no c.:ontc:1ct 
order prev iously entered for a pe riod of e ight 
years from today' s date. llefenrlrint. i.s to have no 
con tact wit h the v ictim or members of the victim'~ 
fami ly. 
Anylh.i.111.1 fuLLhe r from the State? 
MR. PASKETT: Judge, ju~t a clc:1r i fication . 
And I cou l rl have heard the Court wrong. I thought 
you Daid that you were going to ~~nt~nce tor a 
period of eight years , and then you I thought --
